Naturalism & Objectivity: Methods and Meta-methods

dc.contributor.authorMiller, Jean Anneen
dc.contributor.committeechairMayo, Deborah G.en
dc.contributor.committeememberBurian, Richard M.en
dc.contributor.committeememberFuhrman, Ellsworth R.en
dc.contributor.committeememberSpanos, Arisen
dc.contributor.departmentScience and Technology Studiesen
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T20:14:07Zen
dc.date.adate2011-08-19en
dc.date.available2014-03-14T20:14:07Zen
dc.date.issued2008-08-20en
dc.date.rdate2011-08-19en
dc.date.sdate2011-07-18en
dc.description.abstractThe error statistical account provides a basic account of evidence and inference. Formally, the approach is a re-interpretation of standard frequentist (Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson) statistics. Informally, it gives an account of inductive inference based on arguing from error, an analog of frequentist statistics, which keeps the concept of error probabilities central to the evaluation of inferences and evidence. Error statistical work at present tends to remain distinct from other approaches of naturalism and social epistemology in philosophy of science and, more generally, Science and Technology Studies (STS). My goal is to employ the error statistical program in order to address a number of problems to approaches in philosophy of science, which fall under two broad headings: (1) naturalistic philosophy of science and (2) social epistemology. The naturalistic approaches that I am interested in looking at seek to provide us with an account of scientific and meta-scientific methodologies that will avoid extreme skepticism, relativism and subjectivity and claim to teach us something about scientific inferences and evidence produced by experiments (broadly construed). I argue that these accounts fail to identify a satisfactory program for achieving those goals and; moreover, to the extent that they succeed it is by latching on to the more general principles and arguments from error statistics. In sum, I will apply the basic ideas from error statistics and use them to examine (and improve upon) an area to which they have not yet been applied, namely in assessing and pushing forward these interdisciplinary pursuits involving naturalistic philosophies of science that appeal to cognitive science, psychology, the scientific record and a variety of social epistemologies.en
dc.description.degreePh. D.en
dc.identifier.otheretd-07182011-091205en
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-07182011-091205/en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/28329en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.relation.haspartMiller_JA_D_2008.pdfen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectepistemologyen
dc.subjecterror statisticsen
dc.subjectGiereen
dc.subjectHurlberten
dc.subjectmicro-sociology of scienceen
dc.subjectminimal a priorismen
dc.subjectmeta-methodsen
dc.subjectmethodsen
dc.subjectMayoen
dc.subjectKitcheren
dc.subjectLatouren
dc.subjectLonginoen
dc.subjectCollinsen
dc.subjectBACI (Before-After-Control-Intervention) experimenen
dc.subjectrelativismen
dc.subjectreflexivityen
dc.subjectreplicationen
dc.subjectsocial epistemologiesen
dc.subjectrelativismen
dc.subjectpseudo-replicationen
dc.subjectphilosophy of statisticsen
dc.subjectmisspecification testingen
dc.subjectnaturalismen
dc.subjectnew experimentalismen
dc.subjectnormative naturalismen
dc.subjectobjectivityen
dc.subjectphilosophy of experimenten
dc.subjectphilosophy of scienceen
dc.titleNaturalism & Objectivity: Methods and Meta-methodsen
dc.typeDissertationen
thesis.degree.disciplineScience and Technology Studiesen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.namePh. D.en
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