The Politics of Personalized News Aggregation

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dc.contributor.authorHu, Linen
dc.contributor.authorLi, Anqien
dc.contributor.authorSegal, Ilyaen
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-20T18:47:44Zen
dc.date.available2023-01-20T18:47:44Zen
dc.date.issued2023en
dc.date.updated2023-01-20T16:08:19Zen
dc.description.abstractWe study how personalized news aggregation for rationally inattentive voters (NARI) affects policy polarization. In a two-candidate electoral competition model, an attention-maximizing infomediary aggregates source data about candidates’ valence into easy-to-digest news. Voters decide whether to consume news, trading off the expected gain from improved expressive voting against the attention cost. NARI generates policy polarization even if candidates are officemotivated. Personalized news aggregation makes extreme voters the disciplining entity of policy polarization. The skewness of their signals helps sustain a high degree of policy polarization in equilibrium. Analysis of disciplining voters informs the equilibrium and welfare consequences of regulating infomediaries.en
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.orcidLi, Anqi [0000-0002-3686-6178]en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/113326en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.titleThe Politics of Personalized News Aggregationen
dc.title.serialJournal of Political Economy Microeconomicsen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.otherArticleen
dcterms.dateAccepted2023-01-03en
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Techen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Scienceen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Science/Economicsen

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