Institutionalizing Performance Management: Lessons for Government Leaders from the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010

Abstract

One of the most important trends in public management in the United States in recent history has been the spread of goal setting and performance measurement (Rainey 2014, 149), both core elements of a reform movement to make government agencies more transparent, accountable, and results-oriented (Light 1997). In the U.S. Government, the reform was legislated by the Government Performance and Result Act (GPRA) in 1993 and the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) in 2010 and implemented through Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy guidance. Agency responses have ranged from limited use of performance information to comply with the law and only within the headquarters, to a voluntary embrace of its spirit and legislative intent and the routine, purposeful use of performance information at all levels to improve organizational learning, management decisions, and performance. The latter represents full institutionalization of performance management reform. Empirical research on institutional and organizational conditions that lead to variance in institutionalization of performance management reforms predominates in state (e.g. Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008; Taylor 2011; Moynihan 2008), local (e.g. Moynihan and Hawes 2012; Moynihan and Pandey 2010; Yetano 2013) and international contexts (e.g. Ohemeng 2011; Pollitt 2006). For the U.S. Government context, this study seeks to integrate and build on prior research on the effects of institutional or organizational conditions on observable indicators of reform institutionalization in agencies. These indicators include setting goals and performance monitoring (e.g. Lee and Kim 2012), performance information use (e.g. Dull 2009; Moynihan and Kroll 2016; Moynihan and Lavertu 2012) or collaboration (e.g. Choi and Moynihan 2019). Using variable-oriented research designs, none of these studies have been able to characterize causal pathways or account for all conditions simultaneously, thereby limiting their generalizability. Also, conjunctural causation, causal asymmetry, and equifinality are common patterns of causation in organizational settings and in management scholarship; research designs that fail to account for these limit themselves to simple correlations (Furnari et al. 2020; Marx, Cambre, and Rihoux 2013). This study combines correlational and multi-conditional configurational qualitative approaches to assess causality, an unconventional research strategy in the public management literature. The author has additionally been unable to identify a single study that isolated the effect of bureaucratic type (James Q. Wilson 1989) on federal agency institutionalization of performance management. This study addresses this shortfall as well. To further develop this line of research, this study employs the model of institutionalization progression proposed by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) and uses data from a 2017 Government Accountability Office survey of federal managers, an original online interview of 20 federal managers in 12 agencies, and interviews with 6 senior performance system managers and 8 fellows of the National Academy of Public Administration, to conduct a meso-level mixed methods analysis employing hierarchical linear modeling, case research, and fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (FSQCA) to identify which configurations of conditions best explain GPRAMA institutionalization in federal agencies. Among other findings, quantitative models indicated an organizational culture with norms of accountability and empowerment, and organizational capacity for performance evaluation, were by far the strongest individual predictors of reform institutionalization. When a range of theoretical antecedents of institutionalization are combined in qualitative configurational models, the study finds that agencies with immature performance management systems must first build senior leader commitment and supportive attitudes of managers for implementing the reform, and then seek to clarify organizational goals, in order to foster the adoption of performance measures. Agencies that are further along in the process of institutionalization can further the adoption of performance measures by investing in capacity for measuring performance and cultivating a culture of accountability and empowerment. To foster greater use of performance information, the study's findings suggest federal leaders should invest in capacity for performance evaluation and strengthen the credibility of their commitment to performance management reform, but that transforming agency cultures to become more results-oriented, often promoted in the literature, may not be necessary to achieve near-term improvements. Using James Q. Wilson's (1989) typology of bureaucratic designs, the study finds propositions based on it offer analytical leverage to explain variance in patterns of institutionalization of performance management practices between the studied US federal agencies. However, an unexpected finding was that Craft-type agencies are especially likely to use performance information for management decisions. The study contributes 1) U.S. federal context to empirical research on "bottom up" factors mediating "top-down" reform policy implementation, 2) methodological innovation to public management research by employing hierarchical linear modeling to isolate agency-level effects; 3) original use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify configurational pathways to reform policy institutionalization in the U.S. Government; and 4) a transparent technique for classifying federal agencies by Wilson bureaucratic type. The study also offers useful knowledge to legislators, stakeholders, political appointees, and career federal managers to shape the Federal Performance Management Framework and craft tailored management strategies suitable for the characteristics of federal agencies.