Securing the Korean Peninsula with an Armed Nuclear North Korea: Identifying Pathways by Examining Past and Current Negotiations

Abstract

The United States has been at war with North Korea since 1950, although hostilities have been on hold on the peninsula since July 27, 1953. Despite the cessation of active hostilities, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased in recent years when North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Increasing tensions due to nuclear weapons and the frozen state of conflict necessitate a re-evaluation of United States foreign policy on the peninsula to achieve a détente. To date, relations on the Korean peninsula are best described as zero sum. Central to the challenge of achieving détente on the peninsula is the ability to shift actors away from zero-sum behavior to that of positive-sum relationship to achieve gains that foster iterative interactions. As these iterative interactions occur, states extend their view of threats outward and build new reference points for mutual engagement. They become, in the words of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, interdependent. How can the United States shift its relationship with North Korea from one defined by relative gains to one defined by absolute gains? Has the United States or another country effectively transitioned an adversary from a zero- to a positive-sum relationship and what lessons are applicable to relations on the Korean peninsula?