A Critique of Langton on Kantian Substance

Abstract

Rae Langton's interpretation of the distinction between things in themselves and phenomena solves many traditional problems at the expense of Kant's discussion of the categories and time, which she thinks are irrelevant to explaining the problem of affection. Langton applies the concept "substance" in a transcendentally real manner to things in themselves, in order to argue that we are ignorant of the latter because they are causally inert intrinsic properties. In doing so, she misdiagnoses the source of Humility, which can be properly understood by the fact that things in themselves are not objects of experience. Langton misapplies the concept of substance to things in themselves, and says that substance of the First Analogy is phaenomenon substantiatum. I argue that substance is a concept which should only be applied to matter in order to unite perceptions in an objective time order.