Kant's Critical Attitude Towards The Only Possible Argument

Abstract

A great deal of attention has been paid to Kant's claim in the Critique of Pure Reason that all theoretical attempts to demonstrate the existence of God must necessarily end in failure. What has received considerably less attention is the fact that throughout his pre-Critical period, i.e., the period prior to the 1781 publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops a unique argument in support of the possibility of such a demonstration. It is obvious that the Critical Kant can no longer maintain the validity of the argument which he presents in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763); however, it is not obvious exactly how Kant proves that this argument cannot succeed. This thesis is concerned with providing an explanation of the change in Kant's view concerning the possibility of providing a theoretical demonstration of the existence of God.