Kant's Negative Answer to Molyneux's Question

Abstract

While it has recently been argued that Kant's views about space in the Transcendental Aesthetic do not commit him to an affirmative answer to Molyneux's question, there has been very little attention given to the issue of what a Kantian negative answer would look like. The paper begins by defending the view that the arguments of the Aesthetic alone do not provide a direct answer to Molyneux's question. I will then argue that addressing Molyneux's question on Kant's behalf is much more complicated, requiring us to pay special attention to his views on the relationship between vision and touch, the specific sort of concepts that are relevant, and some issues involving the schemata for these concepts. To this end, I will examine the extent to which different considerations in each of these areas lead to radically different, competing answers to Molyneux's question. When difficulties surrounding both of these possible answers are examined, the modified framework that is left standing will support a negative answer.