Protection and Cybersecurity of Inverter-Based Resources

dc.contributor.authorAlexander, Brady Stevenen
dc.contributor.committeechairMehrizi-Sani, Alien
dc.contributor.committeememberMohammadhassani, Ardavanen
dc.contributor.committeememberDe La Reelopez, Jaimeen
dc.contributor.departmentElectrical Engineeringen
dc.description.abstractTraditionally, power system protection describes detecting, clearing, and locating faults in the power system. Traditional methods for detecting and locating faults may not be sufficient for inverter-based resources (IBR) as the fault response of an IBR differs from the response of a synchronous generator. As the composition of the power grid continues to evolve to integrate more IBRs that employ communication-based control algorithms; the power system is also exposed to cyberattacks. Undetected cyberattacks can disrupt normal system operation causing local outages. Therefore, power system protection must evolve with the changes in the grid to not only detect, locate, and clear faults with IBR generation but also detect and mitigate cyberattacks on IBR controllers. This thesis proposes methods for protecting an IBR-based transmission system from: (i) GPS spoofing cyberattacks on a power sharing controller; (ii) open-circuit faults. The GPS spoofing detection algorithm is a decision tree that enables either the proposed state observer--based mitigation technique or the proposed long short-term memory (LSTM)-based mitigation algorithm. The proposed logic for detecting open-circuit faults addresses each subcategory of open-circuit faults: breaker malfunctions, broken conductors, and series arc faults. PSCAD/EMTDC simulations are performed to test the effectiveness of the proposed methods.en
dc.description.abstractgeneralThe desire to reduce carbon emissions from electric power generation is resulting in the simultaneous retirement of fossil-fuel-burning electric power generation and increase in the number of renewable energy resources. These renewable energy resources, or inverter-based resources, respond differently to disturbances than traditional generators, and; therefore, require the development of new strategies to improve the disturbance response of an inverter-based resource. Disturbances in the power system can be divided into two types: (i) normal disturbances; (ii) abnormal disturbances. The response of an IBR to normal disturbances is improved with reliable control, further improved with communication, which ensures the stable operation of the power system. The abnormal conditions can also be split into two categories: (i) cyberattacks; (ii) faults. A cyberattack is when an adversary gains access a system with the goal of causing harm. In IBRs, cyberattacks can degrade power quality and lead to local outages. Faults are events that cause a change in the normal current flow in the power system. Undetected faults can cause local outages, lead to forest fires, and personnel injury; therefore, must be detected, located, can cleared in a timely manner. This work explores methods for detecting and mitigating cyberattacks and detecting faults in the presence of inverter-based resources.en
dc.description.degreeMaster of Scienceen
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.subjectBroken conductoren
dc.subjectGPS spoofingen
dc.subjectinverter-based resources (IBR)en
dc.subjectpower sharingen
dc.titleProtection and Cybersecurity of Inverter-Based Resourcesen
dc.typeThesisen Engineeringen Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen of Scienceen


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