Contextual Knowledge Ascriptions and Non-Contextual Knowledge
dc.contributor.author | Zarella, Michael Stephen Jr. | en |
dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-04-28T08:00:50Z | en |
dc.date.available | 2015-04-28T08:00:50Z | en |
dc.date.issued | 2014-01-03 | en |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper I pair a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions with a non-contextual definition of knowledge, specifically the principle that knowledge is infallible belief. This combination is unusual because proponents of contextualism, understood as a semantic thesis, either do not engage epistemology or suggest that the criteria for knowledge are also context sensitive. In order to sustain the pairing that I suggest, the truth conditions of a knowledge ascription must be distinct from the criteria for knowledge. I believe that this distinction is important and fruitful for two reasons: 1) the distinction allows us to preserve both the principle that knowledge is infallible belief and the conviction that we know a lot; 2) the distinction explains the paradox that certain skeptical arguments are not obviously unsound even though their conclusion does seem absurd. Since I uphold a definition of knowledge that is not context sensitive, my treatment of skepticism is unlike prominent contextualist treatments. | en |
dc.description.degree | Master of Arts | en |
dc.format.medium | ETD | en |
dc.identifier.other | vt_gsexam:1867 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10919/51832 | en |
dc.publisher | Virginia Tech | en |
dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
dc.subject | Knowledge | en |
dc.subject | Knowledge ascriptions | en |
dc.subject | Contextualism | en |
dc.subject | Skepticism | en |
dc.title | Contextual Knowledge Ascriptions and Non-Contextual Knowledge | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en |
thesis.degree.grantor | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University | en |
thesis.degree.level | masters | en |
thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts | en |
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