Conquests of the Common Ground: Mansplaining and Under-Presupposing
dc.contributor.author | ONeal, Annelisa | en |
dc.contributor.committeechair | Hoek, Daniel | en |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Sud, Rohan | en |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Corredor, Mercedes Maria | en |
dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-05-14T08:02:30Z | en |
dc.date.available | 2025-05-14T08:02:30Z | en |
dc.date.issued | 2025-05-13 | en |
dc.description.abstract | In ordinary conversations, a lot gets taken for granted. In order to communicate efficiently, speakers make presuppositions, leaving out information that they know or assume their interlocutor already accepts. Speakers try to match their presuppositions to their interlocutor's, so that they presuppose only what is in fact common ground. In practice, of course, speakers' presuppositions are often imperfect matches. They may reflect an overestimation, or underestimation, of the set of propositions presupposed by an interlocutor. Cases involving a speaker who overestimates her interlocutor's presuppositions are commonly discussed in the literature on accommodation and presupposition exploitation, but cases involving speakers who underestimate their interlocutor's presuppositions have largely been ignored. This paper redresses the gap. My paper has two aims. First, a broad aim: I'll demonstrate that under-presupposing is inherently bad for effective communication, because it stunts the growth of the common ground and impedes conversation participants' sense of equal authority over its contents. I'll accomplish this broader aim in the pursuit of my narrower goal: I'll show that mansplanations are paradigm examples of under-presupposing, and use this notion to propose a new, linguistic account of mansplaining. Of recent pop culture neologisms, 'mansplain,' used to call out men who give women unnecessary and unsolicited explanations, has surely been one of the most influential. The term has recently been subject to philosophical analysis, too, with an emphasis on the harms of mansplaining, by way of connection to epistemic injustice (Dular 2021 and Manne 2021) or illocutionary silencing (Johnson 2020). My focus is instead on mansplaining's linguistic modus operandi, in hopes of providing a clear, practical criterion for identifying mansplanations in whatever context they are uttered. On my account, mansplaining necessarily and centrally involves under-presupposing. An utterance is a mansplanation just in case it amounts to under-presupposing, and is uttered by a man in conversation with a woman (or women) in a broader context where women are marginalized. | en |
dc.description.abstractgeneral | In this thesis, I use resources from the philosophy of language to propose a new analysis of the popular term "mansplanining." Mansplaining has broadly been understood as occurring when a man explains something needlessly to a woman; however, a more precise account is needed in order to effectively discriminate cases of mansplaining from other, look-alike cases. Current philosophical analyses also fall short, I argue; they fail to account for central examples of mansplaining. My analysis of mansplaining depends on the idea of "speaker presupposition" from the philosophy of language. In brief: within any conversation, speakers take some information for granted. When they do so, we say that the speaker has "presupposed" this information. In order to make conversation efficient, speakers need to presuppose neither too much nor too little. I introduce the concept of "under-presuppositon" to describe what goes wrong when a speaker does not presuppose enough, and I argue that under-presupposition is central to mansplaining. On my analysis, mansplaining occurs anytime a man underpresupposes in conversation with a woman, in a broader social context where women are marginalized. Ultimately, this new analysis allows us to identify mansplanations in the real world more effectively than previous philosophical analyses, and it also explains how mansplaining is related to a more basic and familiar phenomenon--underpresupposing. In the course of defending my analysis, I also shed light on debates in the philosophy of language about "common ground" and what speakers ought to presuppose. | en |
dc.description.degree | Master of Arts | en |
dc.format.medium | ETD | en |
dc.identifier.other | vt_gsexam:43439 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10919/132458 | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Virginia Tech | en |
dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
dc.subject | mansplaining | en |
dc.subject | presupposition | en |
dc.subject | common ground | en |
dc.title | Conquests of the Common Ground: Mansplaining and Under-Presupposing | en |
dc.type | Thesis | en |
thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en |
thesis.degree.grantor | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University | en |
thesis.degree.level | masters | en |
thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts | en |