Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality
| dc.contributor.author | Klipfel, Kevin Michael | en |
| dc.contributor.committeechair | May, Simon | en |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | FitzPatrick, William J. | en |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Daskal, Steven J. | en |
| dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-14T21:36:37Z | en |
| dc.date.adate | 2007-06-12 | en |
| dc.date.available | 2014-03-14T21:36:37Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2007-05-11 | en |
| dc.date.rdate | 2010-06-12 | en |
| dc.date.sdate | 2007-05-26 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires that we hold people accountable for the choices that they make but not the circumstances that they find themselves in. My aim in this thesis is to reject luck egalitarianism. My argument builds on the recent critique of luck egalitarianism by Elizabeth Anderson. Anderson rejects luck egalitarianism in favor of a view she calls "democratic equality." The aim of democratic equality is to create a community in which citizens relate to one another as equals. This requires, among other things, that we provide citizens with the necessary capabilities and functionings needed in order for them to function as free and equal citizens. In this thesis I argue that Anderson's critique of luck egalitarianism, although successful against the standard luck egalitarian view, does not undermine a weaker version of luck egalitarianism. This position — which I call moderate luck egalitarianism — claims that we ought to apply the choice/circumstance distinction always and only when doing so does not compromise the aims of democratic equality. This is because it is always unfair, according to luck egalitarians, when some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. Since Anderson's view does not correct for this, we need to combine the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism in the name of fairness. I argue, however, that this is not necessary. Not all inequalities that are the result of people's unchosen circumstances are unfair or unjust; inequalities in income and wealth are unfair only to the extent that they inhibit the ability of individuals to function as free and equal citizens. Thus, luck egalitarians have given us no reason to conjoin the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism: democratic equality suffices. | en |
| dc.description.degree | Master of Arts | en |
| dc.identifier.other | etd-05262007-024827 | en |
| dc.identifier.sourceurl | http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05262007-024827/ | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10919/42799 | en |
| dc.publisher | Virginia Tech | en |
| dc.relation.haspart | KlipfelThesis.pdf | en |
| dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.subject | Egalitarianism | en |
| dc.subject | John Rawls | en |
| dc.subject | Elizabeth Anderson | en |
| dc.subject | Democratic Equality | en |
| dc.title | Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University | en |
| thesis.degree.level | masters | en |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts | en |
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