How Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realism

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dc.contributor.authorLennon, James Prestonen
dc.contributor.committeechairTrogdon, Kelly Griffithen
dc.contributor.committeememberKlagge, James C.en
dc.contributor.committeememberMcPherson, Tristramen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-12T19:12:59Zen
dc.date.available2016-12-12T19:12:59Zen
dc.date.issued2016-07-19en
dc.description.abstractPhilosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs.en
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen
dc.format.mediumETDen
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:7727en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/73678en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectphilosophyen
dc.subjectcognitive phenomenologyen
dc.subjectmoral epistemologyen
dc.subjectphenomenal conservatismen
dc.subjectconsciousnessen
dc.titleHow Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realismen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.levelmastersen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen

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