The Duty to Grieve Strangers

dc.contributor.authorRoe, Laurenen
dc.contributor.committeechairYaure, Philip Christopheren
dc.contributor.committeememberParker, Wendyen
dc.contributor.committeememberMacKenzie, Jordanen
dc.contributor.committeememberHoek, Danielen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-28T08:04:19Zen
dc.date.available2025-05-28T08:04:19Zen
dc.date.issued2025-05-27en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I argue that we have a duty to grieve the deaths of strangers. Specifically, I argue that we have a moral duty to grieve the deaths of fellow members of our social-political communities when their deaths result from systemic injustice. This grief is not identical to the grief one experiences with personal losses, but a distinct political grief. I draw from historical examples of calls made to grieve strangers, focusing specifically on those made by Mamie Till-Mobley following the murder of Emmett Till, to demonstrate that such calls are indicative of an obligation that has heretofore remained neglected in philosophical examination. My argument challenges extant philosophical accounts of the duty to grieve that deny that we have an obligation to grieve strangers. The most dominant contemporary account, developed by Michael Cholbi (2021), argues that we only have reason to grieve the loss of a relationship with those who helped to constitute who we are – our practical identities. In a more recent account, MacKenzie and Cholbi (2024) contend that the duty to grieve is derived from a broader duty of practical fidelity that we only owe to people with whom we share loving relationships. But since strangers cannot and do not antecedently constitute our practical identities, and do not share loving relationships with us, it seems there is no obligation to grieve their deaths. Nonetheless, my argument for political grief demonstrates that despite lacking a personal relationship to the deceased, we have robust reasons to grieve the deaths of those we do not personally know in virtue of a non-personal relationship of co-citizenship. Grieving in these circumstances, I argue, is the means to recognize and grapple with our significant moral connection to, and responsibility for, rectifying these injustices. Moreover, I demonstrate how fulfilling this responsibility is an instrumental good for sustaining thriving social-political communities and shared commitments to justice.en
dc.description.abstractgeneralIn our political lives, we are sometimes called upon to grieve the deaths of strangers. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called upon the nation to recognize the collective loss of the 16th Street Baptist Church Bombing. The family of George Floyd invited the world to grieve his tragic death through a public funeral. After the horrific lynching of Emmett Till, his mother, Mamie Till-Mobley, demanded that the citizens of the United States grieve the death of her son, saying that "people needed to see what was taken from [her], what was taken from all of us" (Till-Mobley and Benson, 140). Could we have an obligation to answer such calls and grieve the deaths of strangers, like Till? One may find the idea of an obligation to grieve strangers unintuitive and argue we should not have a duty to grieve those we do not know. Grief is selective, usually applying only to those with whom we share personal relationships. Moreover, grief is painful—mentally, emotionally, and physically. Why should we undergo grief's pains for someone we do not know? Considerations like these regarding the value and role of grief in our lives have led philosophers to examine when we do and do not have an obligation to grieve. The dominant philosophical account argues that we only have obligations to grieve those who shaped who we are – our practical identities (Cholbi, 2021). Another argues that we only owe grief to those with whom we shared loving relationships (Cholbi and MacKenzie, 2024). But strangers do not shape our identities and do not share loving relationships with us. Thus, it seems there is no obligation to grieve strangers, even if we are called on by others to do so. Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that we do have a duty to grieve strangers. Specifically, I argue that we have a moral duty to grieve the deaths of fellow members of our social-political communities when they result from systemic injustices. Despite lacking a personal relationship to the deceased, my argument makes the case that we do indeed have robust reasons to grieve the deaths of those we do not personally know in virtue of a non-personal relationship of co-citizenship. Grieving in these circumstances just is the way of recognizing our significant moral connection to, and responsibility for, rectifying these injustices. Moreover, I demonstrate how fulfilling this responsibility is an instrumental good for sustaining thriving social-political communities and shared commitments to justice. This grief is not identical to the grief one experiences with personal losses, but a distinct political grief.en
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen
dc.format.mediumETDen
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:43386en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10919/134260en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectGriefen
dc.subjectPolitical Griefen
dc.subjectMoral Dutyen
dc.subjectSocial-Political Communityen
dc.subjectCitizenshipen
dc.subjectMichael Cholbien
dc.subjectStrangersen
dc.titleThe Duty to Grieve Strangersen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.levelmastersen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen

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