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Optimal Consumer-Centric Delay-Efficient Security Management in Multi-Agent Networks: A Game and Mechanism Design Theoretic Approach

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dc.contributor.authorSchlake, Farimehren
dc.contributor.committeechairMili, Lamine M.en
dc.contributor.committeememberClauer, C. Roberten
dc.contributor.committeememberCenteno, Virgilio A.en
dc.contributor.committeememberChen, Ing-Rayen
dc.contributor.committeememberEltoweissy, Mohamed Y.en
dc.contributor.departmentElectrical and Computer Engineeringen
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-06T15:45:19Zen
dc.date.adate2012-05-01en
dc.date.available2017-04-06T15:45:19Zen
dc.date.issued2012-04-10en
dc.date.rdate2016-10-18en
dc.date.sdate2012-04-12en
dc.description.abstractThe main aspiration behind the contributions of this research work is the achievement of simultaneuos delay-efficiency, autonomy, and security through innovative protocol design to address complex real-life problems. To achieve this, we take a holistic approach. We apply theoretical mathematical modeling implementing implications of social-economic behavioral characteristics to propose a cross-layer network security protocol. We further complement this approach by a layer-specific focus with implementations at two lower OSI layers. For the cross-layer design, we suggest the use of game and mechanism design theories. We design a network-wide consumer-centric and delay-efficient security protocol, DSIC-S. It induces a Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible equilibrium among all rational and selfish nodes. We prove it is network-wide socially desirable and Pareto optimal. We address resource management and delay-efficiency through synergy of several design aspects. We propose a scenario-based security model with different levels. Furthermore, we design a valuation system to integrate the caused delay in selection of security algorithms at each node without consumer's knowledge of the actual delays. We achieve this by incorporating the consumer's valuation system, in the calculation of the credit transfers through the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments with Clarke's pivotal rule. As the utmost significant contribution of this work, we solve the revelation theorem's problem of misrepresentation of agents' private information in mechanism design theory through the proposed design. We design an incentive model and incorporate the valuations in the incentives. The simulations validate the theoretical results. They prove the significance of this model and among others show the correlation of the credit transfers to actual delays and security valuations. In the layer-specific approach for the network-layer, we implement the DSIC-S protocol to extend current IPsec and IKEv2 protocols. IPsec-O and IKEv2-O inherit the strong properties of DSIC-S through the proposed extensions. Furthermore, we propose yet another layer-specific protocol, the SME_Q, for the datalink layer based on ATM. We develop an extensive simulation software, SMEQSIM, to simulate ATM security negotiations. We simulate the proposed protocol in a comprehensive real-life ATM network and prove the significance of this research work.en
dc.description.degreePh. D.en
dc.identifier.otheretd-04122012-094602en
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-04122012-094602/en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/77362en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectIncentive Compatibilityen
dc.subjectDominant Strategyen
dc.subjectIPsecen
dc.subjectQoSen
dc.subjectATMen
dc.subjectDelayen
dc.subjectSecurity Protocolen
dc.subjectPerformanceen
dc.subjectOptimizationen
dc.subjectMechanism Design Theoryen
dc.subjectGame Theoryen
dc.subjectBayesian Gamesen
dc.titleOptimal Consumer-Centric Delay-Efficient Security Management in Multi-Agent Networks: A Game and Mechanism Design Theoretic Approachen
dc.typeDissertationen
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
thesis.degree.disciplineElectrical and Computer Engineeringen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.namePh. D.en

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