Game Theoretic and Analytical Approaches to International Cooperation and Investment Problems

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dc.contributor.authorLi, Qingen
dc.contributor.committeechairSherali, Hanif D.en
dc.contributor.committeememberBish, Ebru K.en
dc.contributor.committeememberHuang, Philip Y.en
dc.contributor.departmentIndustrial and Systems Engineeringen
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T20:35:44Zen
dc.date.adate2001-05-12en
dc.date.available2014-03-14T20:35:44Zen
dc.date.issued2001-05-04en
dc.date.rdate2002-05-12en
dc.date.sdate2001-05-09en
dc.description.abstractInternational cooperation and foreign investment issues are two important components of an international economy. The various aspects of research related to such international cooperation and foreign investment decisions are fraught with various complex factors. In this thesis, we consider two specific issues in the arena of international technological cooperation and foreign investments, by using established Operations Research techniques of game theory and multiple criteria decision making. We first analyze regional technological cooperation mechanisms using classical game theory. A concept of regional technological cooperation is developed based on a cooperative game theoretic model, in which a plan of payoff distributions induces an agreement that is acceptable to each participant. Under certain conditions, the underlying game is shown to be convex, and hence to have a nonempty core with the Shapley value allocations belonging to the core. A compensation scheme is devised based on the Shapley value allocations, whereby participants who enjoy a greater payoff with respect to the technological cooperation compensate the participants who receive a relatively lesser payoff via cooperation. In this manner, regional technological cooperation can bring overall benefits to all the involved players in the game. Some insightful examples are provided to illustrate the methodological concept. Next, we discuss a model for analyzing foreign direct investment opportunities and for evaluating related projects based on the International Investment Attracting Force Theory and the technology of fuzzy evaluation. This model is applied to assess the industrial investment projects that were proposed in the â â 95 China's Tumen River Area International Investment and Business Forumâ funded by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Accordingly, the projects are classified into groups based on their potential to attract foreign investors. Furthermore, we simulate the actual forming process whereby projects are sequenced and selected for funding by foreign investors based on a sequential update of their effect on the local economy. The results provide a scientific basis for formulating related decisions and policy recommendations regarding the various proposed projects.en
dc.description.degreeMaster of Scienceen
dc.identifier.otheretd-05092001-124807en
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05092001-124807/en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/32406en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.relation.haspartthesis.pdfen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectSimulationen
dc.subjectTransferable Utilityen
dc.subjectAnalytic Hierarchy Processen
dc.subjectForeign Direct Investmenten
dc.subjectShapley Valuesen
dc.subjectGame Theoryen
dc.subjectRegional Technological Cooperationen
dc.subjectInternational Technology Transferen
dc.subjectChina's Tumen River Areaen
dc.titleGame Theoretic and Analytical Approaches to International Cooperation and Investment Problemsen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplineIndustrial and Systems Engineeringen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.levelmastersen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Scienceen

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