The role of feedback in state support and sponsorship of terrorism: foreign policy implications

Abstract

State support and sponsorship of terrorism is a growing tactic among states unable or unwilling to achieve their international goals using the more traditional means of foreign policy: diplomacy, propaganda, economic statecraft, and military statecraft. This has brought about a new dilemma in the field of foreign policy: How does one state deal with another state as terrorists? As states react to incidents of terrorism, it is equally likely that the terrorist states will react to these responses. Therefore, this thesis considers the following question: How does a state's reaction to state supported or sponsored terrorism affect future terrorism?

In order to answer this question, a case study of Cuba was performed to trace the flow of terrorist support and sponsorship by the state since its inception in 1959. Periods of high and low support for terrorism by the Castro regime were contrasted with responses of the target states, the United States, the Soviet Union and China using a cost/benefit formula. The value of material costs, rhetorical costs, material benefits and rhetorical benefits were compared in an attempt to determine a pattern of events that either consistently increased or decreased Cuba's use of the tool of terrorism in response to feedback from other states.

The case study was inconclusive. Evaluation of terrorism is highly subjective. It became clear that it was impossible to determine the relative weight given to the various costs and benefits accrued through support of terrorism by the Cuban government. The projection of the goals and motivations is only speculation. The only clear pattern that emerged was a decrease in support activity in response to the imposition of significant economic costs on Cuba. However, this only has an effect in situations where no other state was able or willing to fill in the economic gap created by sanctions.