The United Mine Workers Political Action Committee and politics in West Virginia

Abstract

The United Mine Workers newly created political arm-- Coal Miners Political Action Committee (COMPAC)-- is analyzed with regard to its activities in West Virginia. Specific objectives include an historical perspective of the UMW and a look at pressure .group theory applied to tho union I s observed behavior. Throe hypotheses were tested in order to measure the influence of COMPAC in 1975. Chi square values indicate significant relationships between coal producing areas and legislative support for UMW sponsored bills. Results indicate that a "reverse effect" against the UMW exists to some extent in the non-coal producing counties due to the relative lack of COMPAC support where UMW membership is not strong. A less significant relationship between voting sympathies and area represented exists at the committee level. Lobbyists from the coal industry concentrate their influence on the legislative committees that act on mining legislation. This produces action in legislative committees which differs substantially from formal action of the legislative body as a whole. This study suggests that the UMW would benefit more through direct bargaining with the coal industry rather than in its lobbying efforts for legislative gains. The UMW garnered many safety provisions in its 1974 contract with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, whereas COMPAC won no new safety laws from West Virginia legislators in 1975.