Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief

dc.contributor.authorGalvani, Eve Antoinetteen
dc.contributor.committeechairTrogdon, Kelly Griffithen
dc.contributor.committeememberMcPherson, Tristramen
dc.contributor.committeememberKlagge, James C.en
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-12T19:11:27Zen
dc.date.available2016-12-12T19:11:27Zen
dc.date.issued2016-06-27en
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases.en
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen
dc.format.mediumETDen
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:7883en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/73666en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectacquaintanceen
dc.subjectphenomenal absencesen
dc.subjectintrospectionen
dc.subjectprivileged accessen
dc.subjectbeliefsen
dc.titleAcquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Beliefen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.levelmastersen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen

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