Formalizing Blockchain PQC migration: When Is the Migration Deadline?
| dc.contributor.author | Fukuda, Kigen | en |
| dc.contributor.committeechair | MATSUO, SHINICHIRO | en |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Kantarcioglu, Murat | en |
| dc.contributor.committeemember | Lou, Wenjing | en |
| dc.contributor.department | Computer Science and#38; Applications | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-05-29T08:01:56Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2026-05-29T08:01:56Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2026-05-28 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | It is widely recognized that quantum computers pose a fundamental threat to blockchain security. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration is therefore an urgent challenge, yet the following question has remained unanswered: by when must the migration be completed to maintain the security of crypto assets? To address this question, we first formalize the migration process and the quantum adversary based on the Bitcoin backbone protocol framework. We then establish a threshold on the tolerable quantum adversary's capability. Specifically, we prove that a security property migration liveness holds with overwhelming probability if and only if Δeff ≥ Δ∗= ⌈4/(1 − )⌉, where Δeff is the number of rounds from the broadcast of a migration transaction until the quantum adversary can produce a forged transaction, is the honest mining success probability, and is the concentration quality of the underlying random variables. We further extend the analysis to encompass broader classes of blockchains and migration paths by parameterizing the number of honest blocks required during the migration window, with practical implications for real-world deployment. | en |
| dc.description.abstractgeneral | Blockchains such as Bitcoin rely on digital signatures to prove ownership of assets. These signatures are secured by mathematical problems that today's computers cannot solve. However, future quantum computers are expected to break these protections, allowing attackers to steal assets by forging signatures. To defend against this threat, blockchain users must upgrade their accounts to use new, quantum-resistant signature schemes before quantum computers become powerful enough to pose a real danger. This thesis addresses a critical question: by when must this upgrade be completed to keep assets safe? We develop a cryptographic framework that models the upgrade process and the capabilities of a quantum attacker. Using this framework, we prove that there is a threshold in a quantum computer's capability required to complete the upgrade safely. If users migrate their accounts before quantum capability reaches this threshold, their assets remain secure; if they miss it, an attacker with a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could forge transactions and steal funds with non-negligible probability. We also show how this threshold depends on the overall security of the blockchain network, and we extend our results to cover a broad range of blockchain systems and upgrade strategies. These findings provide concrete guidance for blockchain developers and communities planning the transition to quantum-resistant security. | en |
| dc.description.degree | Master of Science | en |
| dc.format.medium | ETD | en |
| dc.identifier.other | vt_gsexam:46856 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10919/143196 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Virginia Tech | en |
| dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.subject | Blockchain | en |
| dc.subject | PQC | en |
| dc.subject | PQC migration | en |
| dc.subject | Liveness | en |
| dc.subject | PoW | en |
| dc.title | Formalizing Blockchain PQC migration: When Is the Migration Deadline? | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Computer Science & Applications | en |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University | en |
| thesis.degree.level | masters | en |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Science | en |
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