Price implications and bidding strategies for electronic computerized markets

The working hypothesis underlying this research was that computerized electronic marketing influences price level and the price discovery process. Electronic markets were also hypothesized to alter bidding strategies of participants.

The theoretical background which stimulated this study arose from the shortcomings of the competitive market system in agriculture. One possible solution to agriculture's pricing problems is electronic markets. Solving the thin market problem through increased participation via electronic markets can help to increase prices.

Three types of buyers use ELPC's system: packers, order buyers, and local buyers. Larger buyers are more disciplined buyers. They bid less, pay lower prices, and obtain a higher percentage of lambs sold. Large buyers have different objectives than smaller local buyers and are under more economic pressure to stay abreast of market conditions.

Electronic markets are unique since they set bid wait time intervals and identities of bidders remain anonymous. Both the bid wait time interval and the anonymity feature significantly influence improvements in price during the auction process. Bid wait time intervals are necessary in developing electronic markets. Finding the optimum interval (9 to 12 seconds) will aid in setting bid increments for new electronic markets. Bidders, with anonymous bidding, will bid for longer periods of time and this means higher prices. This important finding suggests that overt or tacit collusion, which could occur in conventional auctions, does not occur in the computerized sales with the anonymous bidding.