Autonomy and neutrality in liberal political thought

Abstract

A central tenet of liberal political philosophy is the claim that the role of the state is to remain neutral among citizens’ varying conceptions of the good life. In addition to this tenet, some liberals hold the view that we ought to define freedom as individual autonomy. Moreover, such liberals claim that the state is required to promote and protect freedom conceived of as individual autonomy. Such autonomy-based liberalism is frequently criticized for its efforts to simultaneously maintain both views—that is, a commitment both the value of autonomy and a neutrality condition. Critics often argue that since any substantive normative commitment conflicts with the demands neutrality and commitment to the value of autonomy is a substantive normative commitment, liberals cannot consistently be committed to both a neutrality condition and the value of autonomy. This thesis is concerned with providing the best interpretation of liberalism’s theoretical commitments in a way that is consistent with valuing both autonomy and neutrality.