American relations with the Russian Provisional Government, March to November, 1917

Abstract

Successful diplomatic relations between two countries require that those relations be based on the realities of the situation of the countries involved. Whenever those relations are based primarily on preconceived ideas that do not correspond with political realities, they cease to be viable and may result in damage to either or both of the contracting states. Such was the case with American relations with the Provisional Government of Russia in 1917.

The Provisional Government faced the unenviable task of consolidating the gains of the revolution and establishing a democratic government, while trying to conduct a vigorous war against the Central Powers. The two programs were incompatible. Only in peace could Russia make the transition from the “autocracy of autocracies” to that of a democratic nation. One of the reasons why the Provisional Government did not make peace with Germany was the role played by the United States.

American relations with the Provisional Government were designed to aid the fledgling Russian democracy and to keep Russia in the war against Germany. Primary emphasis was placed on the latter goal. The Department of State made it clear to the Provisional Government that it would not receive the aid it so greatly needed should Russia quit the war.

The framers of American policy toward Russia had. little understanding of the Hussian problem. They sincerely wanted democracy to succeed in Russia. But they were convinced that only by the defeat of Germany could Russian democracy hope to survive. Therefore, by stressing Russia's role in the war, the United States pursued what seemed to be the only logical course of relations with the Provisional Government.