An Organizational Analysis of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Abstract

Throughout history, radical individuals have caused violence and tarnished the reputation of many communities and beliefs. Following 9/11, Islamic Terrorism put fear into many individuals. New fronts of the War on Terror began to open as militaries began to engage terrorist groups who sought to take action through radical beliefs. Al Qaeda had opened up a new front and joined the ranks of the Sunni Insurgency to confront the armed forces of the United States as the Invasion of Iraq began to unfold. This new group had radical leaders who were able to incite a stiff and violent campaign against their enemies. The U.S. was able to slow down the group, but not the ideology, tactics, and leadership once it withdrew from the conflict zone. As leaders in the area began to divide their societies by violence and marginalization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria were able to come into power and create small, quasi-legitimate caliphate. Although the group may be somewhat defeated in the region, the ideology will carry on. By using organizational theory, we can better compare both groups and learn from their strengths and weaknesses. Through analyzing this parallel case study, new doors may be opened up for research to be able to slow down radical ideologies and thwart violent actions.