IMF Conditionality and Political Dissent in Developing Nations

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dc.contributor.authorGardner, Jennifer Lynnen
dc.contributor.committeechairLuke, Timothy W.en
dc.contributor.committeecochairReed, Iraen
dc.contributor.committeememberNelson, Scott G.en
dc.contributor.departmentPolitical Scienceen
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T21:35:58Zen
dc.date.adate2007-05-31en
dc.date.available2014-03-14T21:35:58Zen
dc.date.issued2007-04-27en
dc.date.rdate2007-05-31en
dc.date.sdate2007-05-11en
dc.description.abstractConditionality refers to the program policies required by international institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order for countries to be eligible to receive access to resources provided by such institutions. In the case of the IMF these resources are available in the form of loans. The proper role of conditionality as a component of the Fund's financial arrangements with developing nations has been a topic of debate in both the political science and economic fields of study. On the political science side the argument has centered on whether or not austere and structural conditionality can in effect cause political dissent in the developing nations, and whether or not the process of conditionality violates the sovereign rights of nations. In this research study three Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, and Costa Rica) were utilized as case studies to try and determine whether or not their was a casual link between the implementation of IMF conditionality and instances of political dissent manifested as protests, riots, and strikes. Evidence of political dissent directly related to the implementation of IMF conditionality was found in all three case studies at varying levels. The instances of political dissent were then analyzed individually and as a group to try and determine specific cause, group dynamics, and the economic context in which they took place. The study concluded that as practiced in the 1990s and early 2000s conditionality can interfere with the democratic process in developing nations.en
dc.description.degreeMaster of Artsen
dc.identifier.otheretd-05112007-140654en
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05112007-140654/en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/42591en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.relation.haspartJenniferGardnersThesis2.pdfen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectDeveloping Nationsen
dc.subjectConditionalityen
dc.subjectInternational Monetary Funden
dc.titleIMF Conditionality and Political Dissent in Developing Nationsen
dc.typeThesisen
thesis.degree.disciplinePolitical Scienceen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.levelmastersen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen

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