Essays on Network formation games

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorKim, Sunjinen
dc.contributor.committeechairSarangi, Sudiptaen
dc.contributor.committeechairBahel, Eric A.en
dc.contributor.committeememberKovach, Matthewen
dc.contributor.committeememberLin, Xuen
dc.contributor.departmentEconomicsen
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-07T08:00:07Zen
dc.date.available2021-08-07T08:00:07Zen
dc.date.issued2021-08-06en
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible Nash equilibrium configurations in a model of signed network formation as proposed by Hiller (2017). We specify the Nash equilibria in the case of heterogeneous agents. We find 3 possible Nash equilibrium configurations: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in a Nash equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework using the notion of pairwise Nash equilibrium. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: Rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players designate other rich players as their best friends. As a result, We present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because researchers tend to ask respondents to list only a few friends.en
dc.description.abstractgeneralThis dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible singed network configurations in equilibrium. In the signed network, players can choose a positive (+) relationship or a negative (-) relationship toward each other player. We study the case that the players are heterogeneous. We find 3 possible categories of networks in equilibrium: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. In this weighted network model, each player can choose the level of relationship. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players choose other rich players as their best friends. As a result, we present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because these social network data are censored due to the limit of the number of responses.en
dc.description.degreeDoctor of Philosophyen
dc.format.mediumETDen
dc.identifier.othervt_gsexam:32131en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/104598en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectNetwork Formation Gameen
dc.subjectSigned Networken
dc.subjectPositive Assortative Matchingen
dc.subjectContest Success Functionen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.subjectPairwise Stabilityen
dc.subjectWeighted Networken
dc.subjectInequalityen
dc.subjectNested Split Graphen
dc.subjectSocial mixen
dc.titleEssays on Network formation gamesen
dc.typeDissertationen
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomicsen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Kim_S_D_2021.pdf
Size:
2.24 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download

Collections

Doctoral Dissertations