Explanations of the Success of Science

Gannon, Dennis Patrick

Explanations of the Success of Science

dc.contributor.author	Gannon, Dennis Patrick	en
dc.contributor.committeechair	Pitt, Joseph C.	en
dc.contributor.committeemember	Hardcastle, Valerie Gray	en
dc.contributor.committeemember	Hardcastle, Gary L.	en
dc.contributor.department	Philosophy	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-14T20:47:28Z	en
dc.date.adate	1999-06-12	en
dc.date.available	2014-03-14T20:47:28Z	en
dc.date.issued	1998-06-29	en
dc.date.rdate	2000-06-12	en
dc.date.sdate	1998-11-05	en
dc.description.abstract	Many bodies of modern scientific theory (such as both Newtonian and relativistic physics) have proven to be remarkably successful at predicting future observable phenomena. Some philosophers have seen this success as calling for deeper explanation: what is it about these theories that makes them so predictively reliable, when, presumably, not just any theory would enjoy such success? This question has often motivated philosophers (such as Richard Boyd) to adopt a realist stance towards scientific theories, wherein the entities and mechanisms postulated by a successful theory are understood as referring to real entities and mechanisms in the world. However, as Nicholas Rescher has argued, a close look at the concepts employed in scientific theorizing reveals that they are not of the right kind for such a realist explanation to work. His arguments show that at the root of the meaning of each key element of our standard scientific framework is a reference to mental functionings. This being so, an explanation such a Boyd's ceases to be viable, as an approximately accurate picture of the external world would presumably be free of reference to mental functioning. I thus attempt to provide a plausible explanation for the success of science bearing in mind that a straightforward correspondence between the world described by our theories and the world itself does not obtain. Such an explanation relies not only on the features of the external world that our theories might approximate, but also on the ability of mental processes to enrich this world, both in theorizing and in experience.	en
dc.description.degree	Master of Arts	en
dc.identifier.other	etd-110498-011445	en
dc.identifier.sourceurl	http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-110498-011445/	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10919/35595	en
dc.publisher	Virginia Tech	en
dc.relation.haspart	02Thesis.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	01FrontMatter.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	03Vita.pdf	en
dc.rights	In Copyright	en
dc.rights.uri	http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/	en
dc.subject	conceptual idealism	en
dc.subject	realism	en
dc.subject	Rescher	en
dc.subject	success of science	en
dc.title	Explanations of the Success of Science	en
dc.type	Thesis	en
thesis.degree.discipline	Philosophy	en
thesis.degree.grantor	Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University	en
thesis.degree.level	masters	en
thesis.degree.name	Master of Arts	en