The Programming Theory of Creativity

Abstract

Creativity, as the production of creative products, intuitively requires both intention and novelty. However, these two elements seem to stand in tension: if a product is novel to the creator, it appears they could not have intended it, and if they intended it, it seems it cannot be novel to them. This paper explores and dissolves this apparent tension. I begin by discussing the necessity of both intention and novelty for creativity. I then critique Antonia Peacocke's refinement model of creativity, which seeks to reconcile the requirements of intention and novelty through the concept of a proto-work. I argue that there are creative products that the refinement model fails to recognize as such, including those that result from open-ended creative processes. In response, I propose a programming theory of creativity, which distinguishes between broad planning intentions and more specific implementation intentions. On this view, creative products emerge when planning intentions probabilistically constrain implementation intentions, allowing for novelty within an intentional framework. This model captures a wider range of creative phenomena—such as exploratory research and improvisational art—while preserving the intuitive roles of both intention and novelty in creativity.