Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders

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dc.contributor.authorBecker, William J.en
dc.contributor.authorMansi, Sattaren
dc.contributor.authorNazari, Maryamen
dc.contributor.authorWald, John K.en
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-15T20:07:56Zen
dc.date.available2025-01-15T20:07:56Zen
dc.date.issued2023-09-08en
dc.description.abstractResearch Question/Issue: For firms with institutional dual holders, is proxy voting affected by whether the vote is confidential? Does confidential voting affect firms' cost of debt?. Research Findings/Insights: Consistent with social exchange theory and reciprocity norms, we find that, in the absence of confidential voting, firms with institutional dual holders gain more favorable votes for proposals and, in particular, for management-sponsored compensation proposals. Further, these firms pay a higher cost of borrowing. This reciprocity relation does not exist if the firm has confidential voting in place. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The results are consistent with reciprocity norms creating a psychological obligation to repay valuable favors between firm managers and institutional dual holders when proxy votes are not confidential. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings support the popular position that confidential voting is in the best interests of shareholders and rigorous external corporate governance.en
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen
dc.format.extentPages 549-566en
dc.format.extent18 page(s)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12557en
dc.identifier.eissn1467-8683en
dc.identifier.issn0964-8410en
dc.identifier.issue3en
dc.identifier.orcidBecker, William [0000-0002-4648-4122]en
dc.identifier.orcidMansi, Sattar [0000-0001-7098-7996]en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10919/124210en
dc.identifier.volume32en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectconfidential proxy votingen
dc.subjectcorporate governanceen
dc.subjectcost of debten
dc.subjectinstitutional holdingsen
dc.subjectvoting outcomesen
dc.titleProxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holdersen
dc.title.serialCorporate Governance-An International Reviewen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.otherArticleen
dc.type.otherJournalen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Techen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Pamplin College of Businessen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Pamplin College of Business/Finance, Insurance, and Business Lawen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Pamplin College of Business/Managementen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/All T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Pamplin College of Business/PCOB T&R Facultyen

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