Testimonial Injustice and the Puzzle of Hearer Culpability

Abstract

This paper identifies a puzzle in Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial injustice, the puzzle of hearer culpability: how is it possible for hearers to be culpable for beliefs they form on the basis of stereotypes and prejudices that regularly bypass conscious thought? In trying to solve this puzzle, I consider one way to hold hearers culpable despite stereotypes and prejudices bypassing conscious thought, that is, by focusing on the hearer's upstream epistemic practices. I then show that even factoring in upstream epistemic practices, there are cases where the speaker sustains testimonial injustice without the hearer being culpable. To account for these cases then I suggest redefining testimonial injustice in a way that recognizes the role of wider structural factors, and not just individual failings. I sketch a view of this structural dimension of testimonial injustice, drawing on our understanding of another kind of epistemic injustice, hermeneutical injustice. Taking account of this structural dimension, I then offer a richer account of hearer culpability, one that understands culpability to fall on a spectrum.